Interview With Khieu Samphan: The Reasons He Joined the Khmer Rouge, 2004

Sam Borin (Introduction): Mr. Khieu Samphan was born on the 27th of July 1931 in Prey Veng province. He rec-
eived a scholarship to study in France in 1958 and was awarded a doctorate in economics in 1959. Like most
Khmer students, he was inspired by groups of people who opposed foreign colonial rule and who leaned toward
Marxism-Leninism. Khieu Samphan was elected to the Cambodian parliament twice, in 1962 and 1966. He
served as a senior minister in the Sangkum Reastr Niyum regime under the then Prince Norodom Sihanouk
in his capacity as Secretary of Commerce from 1962 to the end of 1963. During his tenure as Secretary of
Commerce, he was considered a clean public servant and a clean politician. In 1967, fearing arrest and execution,
he fled to the jungle to join the Communist Party of Cambodia under the leadership of Saloth Sar, alias Pol
Pot, with the aim of toppling the feudal and reactionary regimes, old and new. Khieu Samphan, who was an
intellectual and an important official, played a vital role in attracting and recruiting other intellectuals, former
public servants, and Prince Sihanouk to join the movement of national liberation. In April 1976, Comrade Khieu
Samphan was appointed as President of the Presidium in place of Prince Sihanouk, who had resigned from the
position. In his highest role in the Democratic Kampuchea regime, Comrade Khieu Samphan played a vital role
as a spokesman for the Khmer Rouge regime. He was a vice-president and deputy prime minister in a tripartite
coalition government which included the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk, and Son Sann factions, formed In
that tripartite coalition, Khieu Samphan was responsible for foreign affairs. In relation to the peace talks in
Paris in 1991, he was the highest representative of the Khmer Rouge delegation. After the peace talks, he
became a member of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia, along with Comrade Son Sen. After the
Paris agreement, the Khmer Rouge faction did not participate in the UN-organised general election of 1993.
He continued his struggle as a guerrilla leader until 1998, when he defected to the government and was
allowed to live freely as an ordinary citizen.

Sam Borin: Mr. President, does what I have just described represent the correct account of your history? Khieu
Samphan: In general, it is correct, but there are some points that I would like to clarify. Sam Borin: Please go
ahead. Khieu Samphan: You described that I leaned toward Marxist groups in order to join the anti-war move
-ment when I was in France. I would like to clarify this. In fact, those who were against the wars when I arrived
in France were not Marxists. At that time, the atmosphere was one of anti-war sentiment against the war in
Vietnam and the war in Algeria, because those wars were the most important ones which killed thousands
of young Frenchmen and destroyed the French economy. We saw that the wars would be lost, especially
the war in Vietnam. When the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu became apparent, anti-war movements were
raging all over the country. So the anti-war movements were not related to any Marxist movements. They
were just student movements. They were not communist movements or anti-communist movements. We
were all anti-war people who shared the common goal of protesting against colonial rule, especially the
wars in Vietnam and Algeria. Those anti-war people included French people, black Africans, North Africans
such as Moroccans and Arabs, etc. That was the atmosphere at that time. This is the first point I would like
to clarify. Secondly, when I fled Phnom Penh there was an arrest warrant against me in an attempt to bring
me to the military court, after the peasants’ uprising in Samlaut. This threat against me was not the first one.
There were a series of threats before. At that time, I realised that His Majesty (Sihanouk), who was the head
of state, had tried to play the role of a reconciliator. Even though he did not like those intellectuals who had
just returned from France, he wanted them to have their voices and to carry out their activities. But around
1966–1967, an election was held which resulted in a right-wing parliament. Lon Nol became prime minister.
That was unusual because the position of prime minister at that time was usually appointed by His Majesty
(Sihanouk), but this time the prime minister was appointed by the parliament.

His Majesty did not object to the appointment because he respected the results of the election. Previously,
His Majesty personally appointed the prime minister from the Sangkum Reastr Niyum Party. But after he
received too many criticisms about his direct appointments, he agreed to allow parliament to choose a
prime minister. So that is why there was a right-wing parliament. All researchers have also written what
I have just described. Sam Borin: Mr. President, when you said that it was a right-wing parliament, do you
mean that it was the parliament formed under the Sangkum Reastr Niyum regime? Khieu Samphan: Yes,
that is correct. At that time we were still under the Sangkum Reastr Niyum, but all researchers have called
that parliament a right-wing parliament because most of the Members of Parliament were leaning toward
the policy of Gen. Lon Nol. At that time, there were groups of people in Phnom Penh who began to talk
about a “Khmer Suharto-Nasution” (referring to the coup d’état staged by Suharto and Nasution in
Indonesia in 1965). Sam Borin: As we agreed in our first interview, I would like to invite you once again to
this interview. Welcome, Mr. President. Khieu Samphan: Thank you, Mr. Sam Borin. Sam Borin: Previously,
you told me and our listeners that you are no longer the President of the Presidium. You are now just an
ordinary person. Khieu Samphan: That’s right. Sam Borin: I have thought that for me to call you “President”
might make some people think that I am giving too high an honour to a suspected criminal, etc. But I wish
to clarify that the reason I call you Mr. President or Mr. ex-President in the interview is because I would like
you to think back to the time when you were the leader of the Democratic Kampuchea regime. That is why
I have used the title. Do you have any objection to that? Khieu Samphan: If you would like to bring my
memories back to that period by calling me Mr. President, I would not mind. But I would also like to take
this opportunity to say to people that at that time I was not the real leader. I was a leader in name only.
Sam Borin: I hope that all our listeners now understand the reason why I called Mr. Khieu Samphan “Mr.
President” or “Mr. ex-President.” In fact, Mr. Khieu Samphan himself did not object to me calling him Mr.
President of the Presidium or simply Mr. President. Is that OK with you? Khieu Samphan: Yes, it’s OK.

Sam Borin: Mr. President, if I’m not wrong, in your previous answers in past interviews, especially in relation
to you giving up political struggle — in particular your parliamentary struggle — you said that the threats against
your security and safety did not just happen in 1967 alone. There were a series of threats to your security
before then. Is that right? Khieu Samphan: That’s right. Sam Borin: When we come to this point, I have always
heard our older people talk about one incident when you were an editor of the L’Observateur newspaper,
which many people considered a left-wing newspaper. At that time there were claims that secret police agents
kicked your motorbike while you were riding it. After the motorbike crashed, they stopped and strip-searched
you. Can you describe how that incident happened? Khieu Samphan: At that time when I published my own
newspaper, we did not have any advanced technology like now — such as computers or printers, etc. Most
of my staff could not even speak or write French. They had to set up the French letters manually one by one
to create a text article. When they created the article to print, they could not even read it. They just put the
letters one by one to form an article and then printed it. So they made a lot of errors because no one could
read and understand French. Only I could read and understand French, so I had to work with them from
morning till afternoon. After I finished my work, I rode my motorbike home. I had just left my office, which
was not far from the Chinese Hospital on Norodom Sihanouk Boulevard. Sam Borin: Your newspaper office
was near the Chinese Hospital? Khieu Samphan: Yes, it was. And in front of the Chinese Hospital there was
a school, but I forgot the name. Sam Borin: If I’m not wrong, it could be the 18th March School, which was
later renamed Yukanthor High School. Khieu Samphan: It is possible that the school was renamed the 18th
March School after the 1970 coup. Yes, that’s right. My newspaper was on the side of the Chinese Hospital,
and on the opposite side there was a school.

Sam Borin: Mr. President, do you remember why the secret police strip-searched you at that time? Khieu Samp
-han: No, at that time I did not know the reason. First, I thought they were ordinary people because they were
dressed in old civilian clothes like cyclo-pousse (rickshaw) drivers. But when I thought carefully, I knew they
were not ordinary cyclo-pousse drivers. Later, because of the arrest warrants against me, I came to the concl
-usion that they were not just ordinary cyclo-pousse drivers. That incident happened like this: they kicked my
moving motorbike, and when it crashed they arrested me. They tried to take off my clothes and I struggled with
them very hard. But because there were too many of them, they succeeded in stripping me of my clothes in the
middle of the street in broad daylight. So I ran to a nearby house and the owner gave me a kramar (a towel-
type piece of cloth) to cover myself. That’s what happened. Sam Borin: Did that incident happen while you were
a member of parliament or before that? Khieu Samphan: It happened before I became a member of parliament.
At that time I was still an editor of my newspaper. I became a member of parliament after that incident. When
I closed my newspaper, after discussing it with Mr. Sang Yun, I applied for membership of the Sangkum Reastr
Niyum Party. He advised me: “Samphan, don’t publish your newspaper anymore. You must apply to become
a member of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum Party, stand in the election, and I will help you become a member
of parliament.” At that time His Majesty (Sihanouk) made great efforts to implement a policy of neutrality. But
due to immense pressure from America and many other factors, the Prince made an effort to make friends
with the socialist countries. Also at that time, during the Bandung Conference of the non-aligned countries,
the Prince had established a very good friendship with the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai because the Bandung
Conference was an initiative of Nehru and Zhou Enlai. There were lots of Cambodia’s friends at the conference.

Sam Borin: I will ask you about this point later. But now I would like to return to one point which I remember cl
-early: you were one of the ardent supporters of the policy of neutrality envisaged by Prince Sihanouk. When
you fled to the jungle in 1967, it was during a period under Sihanouk’s rule. I’m wondering, since you were a
member of parliament of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum Party, and the president of the party was also the head
of state, why did you flee to the jungle instead of explaining your case to the party’s president? At that time,
what sort of support did the party’s president (Sihanouk) give to you? Khieu Samphan: That event occurred
as I have told you before. It was due to the peasants’ uprising in Samlaut. So the local authorities launched
systematic persecutions similar to the persecutions carried out by Suharto against the Indonesian Communist
Party. There were too many killings. That’s why at that time people were whispering to each other around
Phnom Penh that in Cambodia there was also a Suharto-Nasution clique. Sam Borin: Mr. President, on this
point I would like to clarify something. In 1967 or even 1968, it was a period under the Sangkum Reastr Niyum
regime. You said that the authorities persecuted the people. Were the authorities from the Sangkum Reastr
Niyum or from somewhere else? Khieu Samphan: Now we have seen clearly. At that time we could not see
anything clearly. During the Sangkum Reastr Niyum regime there were people from many different political
persuasions. Those who joined the Sangkum Reastr Niyum Party came from many different parties such as
the Democratic Party, the Neang Kunghing (Earth) Party, etc. Each one of them still held their old ideologies,
which led to many schools of thought and different political leanings. No one knew who beat me up at that
time. Only later did people find out who they were. At that time there were rumours that those who beat me
up were people who did not like me because they accused me of being a Khmer Rouge. They said it was
the cyclo-pousse drivers and ordinary people who hated me who carried out the attack. At that time no one
knew that it was the police who carried out that attack. But Kou Roun, who was Minister of Security, went
around showing off the photo of the attack on me to everyone to make fun of me.

So from then on, people knew that it was Kou Roun’s police who attacked me. From the beginning, people
never thought that the attack was the work of the police. They thought it was the work of cyclo-pousse
drivers who hated me. When Kou Roun got the photo of the attack, he went around showing it off to every
-one. That’s why everyone knew it was Kou Roun’s police who attacked me. Later, someone did an inv-
estigation and found out more about that. I never thought of reporting it to anyone because I was not one
hundred percent sure. Also, I did not want to complicate the matter further. So I just continued to do my
newspaper work as usual because I did not want any more trouble. Sam Borin: I would like to ask you, in
your capacity as a member of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum Party, what was the relationship between the
party members and the party president at that time? Khieu Samphan: As far as I can remember there was
no relationship. The Prince probably knew that those who attacked me were people who did not like me
— whom they accused of being a Khmer Rouge — because of what I wrote in my newspaper. Mr. Kou
Roun had once called me into his office and questioned why someone like me who graduated with a
doctorate did not apply for a job with the government. Why did I become an editor of my own newspaper?
Was it because I was against the policy of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum? I have to admit that when I studied
in France I observed that most people who had higher qualifications also became editors of newspapers
after they graduated. It was a normal thing. My decision to establish my own newspaper was because I
wanted to lead a life as an intellectual who lived with ordinary people. So I heard a lot of diverging opinions
from ordinary people. At that time there were two distinctive schools of thought. One side was very happy with
the outcome of the Bandung Conference, which could lead our country to prosperity because it envisaged
a policy of neutrality — neither leaning toward America nor toward the Soviet Union.

Those people who supported that policy were monks, ordinary people, teachers, and even intellectuals
who had just returned from study abroad. All of them wanted Cambodia to follow this path. Even I myself
supported that policy. This is the first point I wanted to make. The second point is that I noticed that in the
Sangkum Reastr Niyum regime there were people from sections of the armed forces who did not like
Sihanouk’s policy of neutrality because it could create problems with America. They thought that we
sided with the Resistance, especially the Vietnamese resistance. These people thought that because
we were not truly neutral, we would anger America anyway. As a result, we would always have problems
with America. So since then, those kinds of people, such as military leaders, viewed that Cambodia always
needed American aid. These sections of the people were not confined to the military alone but also incl
-uded business people. They all needed American aid and they always complained about our policy of
neutrality. So at that time we had two schools of thought. Even intellectuals who went to study in France
were divided on the issue of neutrality. One side supported the policy of neutrality agreed at the Bandung
Conference because they thought that it was the right path. They saw that many countries from Africa also
followed that path as they did not want to support either the American side or the socialist bloc. Also at
that time we had the Dap Chhuon Affair, when Dap Chhuon accepted an arms cache from the South
Vietnamese government. He also received 270 kilograms of gold from South Vietnam in an attempt to
stage a breakaway by cutting off the northwestern provinces from the central administration. The authorities
found out about the plan and destroyed it before it was carried out. But the Cambodian authorities thought
that the problem might not end there. They had to do something to prevent another possible Dap Chhuon
-style uprising. The authorities assumed that a weapons cache from South Vietnam must be the work of
America, who had recruited people from Cambodia to oppose the path decided in Bandung.

On the other side of the intellectual circle, they thought that the only path to survival for Cambodia was to
establish a republic. But one side of this camp argued that if Cambodia was to establish a republic, where
could they get support from? They must seek American support in order to topple the monarchy and establish
a republic. So this issue posed a problem and they had to discuss the pros and cons. When I heard all those
diverging opinions, I decided to establish my own newspaper to support the policy of neutrality and to gen-
erate debate on the pros and cons of both views. That was the reason why I established my own newspaper.
As a result, I was accused of opposition to His Majesty (Sihanouk) just because I did not join his government.
In fact, I was never against him. My newspapers have been archived, so if anyone wants to know they can
read them and will see whether I was against him or not. But at that time there were accusations that I was
against His Majesty. That’s why I was attacked by the secret police. Sam Borin: Mr. President, when you
mentioned the reason why you established your own newspaper was because of the diverging views at
that time between supporters of the free world and supporters of the socialist world, one reason among
others was that you saw that the policy of neutrality agreed at the Bandung Conference was not implemented
properly in Cambodia because Cambodia allowed foreign troops, especially Vietnamese troops, to station
on neutral Cambodian land. In your capacity as a member of parliament of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum
Party, how did you view that issue? What view did you present to the party and the party president? Khieu
Samphan: According to my recollection, we debated this issue in parliament on the one hand, and on the
other hand we privately discussed it amongst ourselves as members of parliament and in the intellectual
circle. We came to the conclusion that, in fact, His Majesty (Sihanouk) did not allow those Vietnamese
troops to station on our soil. In the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese resistance side had fought to unite
their country but they were met with resistance from America, which supported the South Vietnamese
administration. At that time, the American side was militarily stronger.

So the Vietnamese resistance fighters were forced to escape and hide in areas along our borders. Prince
Sihanouk knew that militarily we did not have enough troops to push them out. If we tried to push them
out we would have more problems with them. So the Prince turned a blind eye and let them stay there.
But he insisted that those Vietnamese troops who were stationed on our soil must recognise the current
borders of Cambodia. He had not only asked the Vietnamese resistance side to respect our border. He
had also demanded that the South Vietnamese, the Americans, the North Vietnamese, and other countries
around Cambodia respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia within the current border
demarcations. So if we talk about the reality and in fairness, we can see that Prince Sihanouk had never
sold our land to the Vietnamese like some of our intellectuals had said. That’s what happened. Sam Borin:
On this point, other than being one of the intellectuals, you were also one of the politicians who strongly
supported Prince Sihanouk’s policy of neutrality. When foreign troops came to station on our soil, what
do you think about the government allowing them to station in our border areas or even in some parts of
Cambodia’s provinces? Khieu Samphan: This is my view: right or wrong, we can discuss it further in order
to use it as a lesson for our history. There are many issues which have to be debated and discussed so
that we can learn from our history. For this issue, this is how I understand it: At that time it was not only
me who had this sort of view. This was how most of us understood the issue at that time — that we had
to be practical. We did not have enough forces to drive the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese out because
the North Vietnamese forces had defeated the French forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. On the other
hand, our troops had never fought any war. We had no experience in fighting. So if we used military means
to solve the problem, I was of the view that it was not the right way. If we wanted to solve the problem
that way we must join with the American forces. But we could not even do that because the American
forces were busy fighting their own war. So they would not be happy to help us.

In my view, Prince Sihanouk’s policy at that time was to contain and confine the war to the border areas
and not to allow it to spill over deep inside Cambodia. But he could not do that because both sides had
strong military forces. So when they fought each other they could not avoid spilling the war into Cambodia.
But we had to contain the fighting at the border areas and not allow it to spill deep inside our country.
That’s what happened. But if we attacked them they would surely fight back because they had nowhere
else to go. And we could not fight them because we did not have enough troops. Sam Borin: Cambodia
at that time knew that it had no forces to fight against the Viet Cong who stationed their forces on our
soil illegally. But according to the behaviour of our government at that time, it seemed to be against
America and therefore turned a blind eye to the other forces using our soil to fight against America.
This was the issue. Khieu Samphan: Yes, if we look at the situation through this angle we can see it
this way. But in my own personal view, Vietnam should not create any problems with Cambodia anymore
after that because Cambodia, during Prince Sihanouk’s rule, helped Vietnam to a certain extent. And
Cambodia, after the 1970 coup d’état — that is to say during the Khmer Rouge regime — had helped
Vietnam to a certain extent as well. This is a fact. So Vietnam should not cause any trouble for Cambodia.
Like in 1967–1968, Vietnam stopped respecting our borders which they had in the past agreed to respect.
I hope to have an opportunity to discuss this issue with you later. Sam Borin: I would like to bring you back
to your first ‘open letter’. On point three, you said that you never knew any leaders of the Communist Party
of Cambodia. You never liked or joined that party before. Why then, when you got into trouble (in 1967), did
you seem so sure that they would ensure your safety and security? How did it turn out like that?

Khieu Samphan: You are right. But when I was threatened with arrest, as I told you before, the situation at
that time was not the same as before. The threats against me could not be taken for granted. My security
in Phnom Penh could no longer be assured, so I had to flee. That’s the first point. On the other hand, I saw
that those who had fled to the jungle before me had followed my situation very closely. So they sent me
and Hou Youn a letter because both of us were ordered to be arrested by military court as we were accused
of being leftists. Hou Youn and I were the main targets of the arrests. At that time they sent a messenger,
who was a respectable and credible old man whom I knew when he was a member of the senior citizens’
association of Sisowath College. That association used to meet very often for dinner, etc., to discuss various
issues. We had touched on the current state of affairs of Cambodia at that time. After that, both Hou Youn
and I knew that old man very well. Sam Borin: Mr. President, can you tell our listeners about the identity of
the old man who handed the letter to you? Khieu Samphan: Yes. That old man was a doctor who had joined
the senior citizens’ association. Sam Borin: What was his name? Khieu Samphan: Sorry, I can’t remember
his name because it was a long time ago. Sam Borin: I hope you can recall his name in our next interview.
Khieu Samphan: Yes, sure. The contents of the letter mentioned the current political situation in Cambodia
at that time. So I assumed that because the writer had a deep understanding of the political situation, he
must be a political activist chosen by the people from the jungle base to be the messenger. Sam Borin: Did
that letter have any signature on it? Khieu Samphan: There was no signature because the situation at that
time was dangerous, so they had to be cautious. Sam Borin: Can you assume who the letter writer was and
who the leaders of the movement were at that time?

Khieu Samphan: At that time no one knew for sure. We just knew for a long time that there were people flee
-ing to the jungle. We only knew very sketchy details. Those people had organised the movement in their
jungle base. So I discussed with Hou Youn that we had nowhere to escape to other than taking the risk and
fleeing to join those people in the jungle. At that point we realised that this old man must be genuine in
helping us to escape if we were to survive. But to what degree he could help us, we were not yet sure. So
that’s why we decided to flee to the jungle. After we got that letter and because we had not escaped, the
old man came to see us and asked why we hadn’t escaped. Was it because we were too scared to flee?
It took us many days before we decided to go to the jungle. After we decided to go, the old man came to
fetch us in his car and drove us to Route Three. At dusk we reached a place just before Ang Ta Sorm. At
that time there was a group of people waiting for us there. We got off the car and they gave each of us a
bike. We rode the bikes off the road and onto the dike one after the other in the middle of the rice fields by
following the light of the stars. When we reached our destination, we noticed that a delicate security arrang
-ement had been organised to facilitate our escape. They passed a message by whispering from one person
to another that we were one of them and not a threat. So they let us go through. In fact, we rode a bicycle
for less than half an hour before we reached our jungle base. When we reached that village they asked us
to go up into a house. When I got up to the house the first person I saw was Ta Mok, who sat quietly there.
Sam Borin: Mr. President, I would like to clarify this point a little bit. Who was the first person you met?
Khieu Samphan: Ta Mok. Sam Borin: You mean our Ta Mok, the one who is presently being detained?
Khieu Samphan: Yes, yes, that’s right. At that time he was in Kampong Speu. He was in charge there.
In fact, I never knew him before. At that time I didn’t even know who he was. They just introduced him
to me as Ta Mok. At that time he was dressed in a black short-sleeved shirt and shorts. The shirt had
no buttons because I could see that his chest was full of hair.

Sam Borin: What was the name of the village where you met Ta Mok for the first time? Khieu Samphan:
The name of the village was Cheung Tong village, Cheung Tong commune, Samrong Tong district, Kam
-pong Speu province. At that time we sat cross-legged around a kerosene lamp. Our first meeting was
very short. He just asked us where we were going and which way we came through, etc. It was just a
normal conversation. A short time later he invited the owner of the house to join us. Sam Borin: What
was the date and month when you first met Ta Mok? Khieu Samphan: When I left Phnom Penh it was
in 1967, April or something like that. I cannot remember the month but I remembered the year clearly.
Sam Borin: Due to some records we knew that you and your former comrade Pol Pot, alias Saloth Sar,
studied at Kampong Cham College together. This is the first point. The other point is that both of you
studied in France together. When you entrusted your security to the Khmer Rouge movement, did you
know at that time that your former comrade Pol Pot was the leader of the Communist Party of Cambodia?
Khieu Samphan: No, in fact I did not know clearly that he was the president of that party. But I knew
Pol Pot, alias Saloth Sar, when we studied in Kampong Cham together. He was one grade ahead of
me. Secondly, he was older than me so we were not very close at that time. But I noticed that he was
a sportsman, a soccer player. He was also a musician, a violin player. When there was a students’
performance at the school he was the one who helped to organise it and played the music for the
performance. I never knew that the Saloth Sar I knew in Kampong Cham was in fact Pol Pot later on.
When we left Kampong Cham he took a senior high school diploma exam before me. I can’t remember
whether he passed or failed. I didn’t know where he had gone to study after that. When I went to study
in France I never met him because when I arrived he had already returned to Cambodia.

Sam Borin: When you returned to Cambodia, did you know where Saloth Sar was working at that time?
Khieu Samphan: I knew that he was a teacher at Chamroeun Vichea College. But I never paid attention
to what he was doing because I was not interested. I just knew from some people that he worked there
as a teacher. Sam Borin: When you sought refuge and protection from the Communist Party of Cambodia,
when was the first time you met Saloth Sar? Khieu Samphan: I only met Pol Pot after the coup d’état
in 1970. Sam Borin: Where did you meet him? Khieu Samphan: I met him at Stung Chinit (Chinit River)
along the border of Kampong Thom province and Kampong Cham, north of Phnom Trong, near the Kan
Ven Centre. So I met him only after the 1970 coup in his capacity as the leader of the Communist Party
of Cambodia. I was very, very surprised because I never thought that the Saloth Sar I knew at Kampong
Cham College could be this important. Sam Borin: Mr. President, I still remember in your previous comments
that before the 1970 war, there was a war between the authority of the Sangkum Reastr Niyum and the
communist resistance. Is it true that the first war occurred in Samlaut? Khieu Samphan: No, in fact the first
conflict did not happen in Samlaut. Samlaut was a peasants’ uprising who revolted against the authorities
who confiscated their lands. After more studies we found out that it was an instantaneous peasants’ uprising
without any involvement from the Communist Party of Cambodia or the Khmer Rouge leaders at all. But
there were some Khmer Rouge leaders who lived there and also took part in the uprising. But it was not
orchestrated or organised by the Khmer Rouge movement. Pol Pot said later that he did not support that
uprising because if there was an uprising like that the armed forces would use the excuse to destroy the
movement. We knew that the Samlaut crackdown was heavy-handed, violent, and brutal.

Too many peasants were killed — about one thousand of them. The survivors managed to escape to Vay
Chap Mountain. Vay Chap Mountain was where the former anti-French resistance fighters and the Viet
Minh fighters had hidden their weapons. Vay Chap Mountain now doesn’t have much forest, but at that
time the areas along Route Six were dense jungle. So when those peasants reached the Khmer Rouge
base they were provided for and trained as fighters. The Samlaut uprising coined the term “hunt down
the Khmer Rouge”. Sam Borin: Who coined the phrase “hunt down the Khmer Rouge”? Khieu Samphan:
It was a slogan from the authorities. It was from Lon Nol’s authority to be precise, because at that time
everyone knew that Gen. Lon Nol was very fiercely against the Vietnamese communists. So by being
strongly anti-Vietnamese communist he was also fiercely against the Khmer Rouge. At that time the term
“Khmer Rouge” had already been coined. Whenever there was an uprising they always blamed it on the
Khmer Rouge. Even when there was a student demonstration they blamed it on the Khmer Rouge. When
there was a student demonstration in Siem Reap they blamed it on the Khmer Rouge. So the incident in
that year was not yet a war. The reason they used to accuse me of supporting the Samlaut Uprising was
because I, Hou Youn, and other intellectuals were leftist politicians. That’s why there were arrest warrants
to put us on trial in the military court. The Samlaut Uprising was in fact not very significant, but due to the
brutal crackdown it was similar to the brutal crackdown carried out by Suharto and Nasution against the
communists in Indonesia. That’s why there was talk among people living in Phnom Penh that in Cambodia
there was also a “Suharto-Nasution.” That’s what happened. I could not take the accusation against me
at that time for granted. The Khmer Rouge from the resistance base told me that if I did not escape I would
face grave danger to my life. So they said that I must escape and they would help facilitate my escape.

Sam Borin: I remember that you said that before the 1970 war there was a war before that. What was that
war? Khieu Samphan: After the crackdown in Samlaut there were crackdowns in other rural areas and in
Phnom Penh as well. So the Khmer Rouge realised that if they did not have any weapons to resist and
fight back against Gen. Lon Nol’s army they would all be massacred like those people who escaped to
Vay Chap Mountain. So they decided to take up arms and combine armed struggle with political struggle.
That was their aim. They realised that they could not continue their political struggle alone. They must
combine armed struggle with political struggle. But at that time the Khmer Rouge had no weapons and
began searching for backers. So they decided that they must look to the North Vietnamese. That was
what I was told later because at that time I didn’t know anything clearly. At that time the North Vietnamese
refused to provide us with weapons. Even one gun they refused to give us. But they had their own reasons
because at that time they needed to transport their weapons through Kampong Som port as all weapons
from China had to go through Kampong Som port because the Ho Chi Minh Trail was heavily bombarded
by American planes. All forces travelling from North Vietnam were almost destroyed before they reached
Cambodian territory. All the weapons transported by trucks were almost completely destroyed so the Ho Chi
Minh Trail could not be used since 1967. That’s why they used the Kampong Som port to transport weapons
instead. When the ships arrived, trucks belonging to the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces were waiting to
transport them through Phnom Penh, with full military escort, to the eastern borders. The trucks often stopped
in Phnom Penh to pick up food supplies such as rice to give to the Vietnamese. So if the Vietnamese provided
us with weapons they were afraid that His Majesty (Sihanouk) and the royal government, led by Gen. Lon Nol,
would close their supply routes. But on the side of the Khmer Rouge, who were persecuted and cracked down
on everywhere, they were very, very angry.

That was the beginning of the disputes between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese. So after that, where
did the Communist Party of Cambodia get their weapons? They took them from the government military ware-
houses of Gen. Lon Nol. Lon Nol at that time was both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Commander
-in-Chief of the armed forces. So the Khmer Rouge stole weapons from government military warehouses. In
the area where I lived in Kampong Speu there were lots of weapons being stolen from the government. Our
soldiers surrounded the warehouses and went in to take the weapons. We could do that because we had our
agents there whom we recruited from peasant families to act as our secret agents. That’s how we got our
weapons. Sam Borin: If I’m not wrong you have said that the North Vietnamese refused to provide weapons
to the Communist Party of Cambodia because they needed permission from the government of Gen. Lon
Nol and Prince Sihanouk to transport their ammunition through Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge were able to
get their weapons to wage war through their militants working in military warehouses who acted as agents.
Khieu Samphan: We got weapons through our guardian units who were secretly recruited by us. Some of
them had also joined the militant units. They also carried guns. Those people had the habit of borrowing
guns to go hunting from the guards who were not our agents. Because our agents were also guards there,
they could go in and out as normal. So our agents, after they got the guns, would turn against the other
guards by pointing the guns at them. They then allowed our people from outside to go in and take the
weapons. That was the job of Ta Mok’s boys from the Southwestern Region. The units from the Southwestern
Region under Ta Mok were able to steal more weapons than any other units. The other areas which got
weapons this way were in Rattanakiri and the Northeast Region, but they got fewer weapons because
there were not many weapons to steal — only crossbows, etc.

Sam Borin: Was the strategy of stealing weapons at that time carried out concurrently between all the regions
or at different times? Khieu Samphan: The plan was to carry it out concurrently because of the experience in
Vay Chap Mountain. The people there went to dig out weapons and fight against the government at different
times, which was not effective. So they did not want to do that again. They wanted all the forces everywhere
to fight at the same time so that Gen. Lon Nol’s army would not be able to mobilise their forces to destroy us
one by one. When there were concurrent campaigns we were able to stand up to them and seize more weapons
from Lon Nol’s army to wage guerrilla warfare. But all the weapons we were able to seize were really, really
old weapons. I was there. I saw all those weapons when I was in Prey Thom (the Great Jungle), north of
Route Four. All those weapons were from the World War One period. They were very old. We could only
shoot one bullet at a time. The Khmer Rouge were very happy because those weapons were better than
nothing. So since then, Gen. Lon Nol’s forces could not go to crack down in any village because the villagers
would fight back and could even seize more weapons from them. That was the first war in 1968. At that time
the Khmer Rouge began to train their forces. Sam Borin: Mr. President, when you first joined the Khmer Rouge
what was your role at that time? Khieu Samphan: I did not have any function at that time. When I first arrived,
as I told you before, they wanted me to hide quietly in Cheung Tong village for about four months in order for
me to get used to jungle life. They provided coffee and so on because we could still buy cakes and sweets
there as usual. If we needed them we just asked the people and they would go buy them at Ang Ta Sorm.
After a short time there, Ta Mok came to tell me that they had to move me to the other side. I could not stay
there anymore because the government might find out. They did not want me and Hou Youn to be arrested
by the government. In order to evade the authorities I could not stay in one place for too long. I had to move
from one place to another. Sam Borin: When you stayed in each place, did Ta Mok ever take you and Hou
Youn to meet with the guerrilla fighters? Khieu Samphan: No, because at that time they did not want anybody
to know that we were living there.

Even among themselves they did not let anyone know that I was there. But as usual there were still some
people who knew we were living there. Their policy was not to let anyone know that we were there, and
as a result they never let us join their meetings. But in the village where I stayed they talked openly about
politics. That’s why later on they called that village a “Sangkum Niyum” (socialist) village, a liberated
village, and so on. They used a lot of new capitalist and liberal vocabulary that we never thought they
could use in the rural and Khmer Rouge zone. Sam Borin: Can you give us an example of the words they
used? Khieu Samphan: For example, they talked about materialism, about history, about rice association,
about medical association, and they talked about the kerosene association, etc. It was interesting, so
we both tried to listen and understand them as it gave us something to cheer about. Sam Borin: At that
time were you aware of who the most important leaders in the Communist Party of Cambodia were? Khieu
Samphan: No, I didn’t know because Ta Mok rarely came to see us. When he came to see us he never
talked about who the leaders were or where they lived. He never told us anything like that. We both were
too afraid to ask. Because they were waging a guerrilla war they were very secretive. You only know about
your own business and you should not want to know anyone else’s business. “See nothing and hear nothing.”
That was their slogan. So I never wanted to ask them anything. Later I learned that the “rice association”
was a way of helping each other. After the harvest those who had more rice could keep some and put some
in the association to help those who did not have enough rice to feed their family. The rice allocated to
the association was earmarked for lending to people in need without charging any interest. As for the
“medical association,” it meant that when people bought medicines they were not to make any profits
when they resold them to the villagers. They were allowed to sell at the same price as when they bought
them plus the costs of their journey. The “kerosene association” was the same. They bought kerosene in
big containers. When they sold to the villagers they had to charge the same price as when they bought it.
They were not allowed to make any profits. I was so surprised because I did not think that they were able
to organise all of these. Sam Borin: Now, I would like to touch on another issue in relation to the war in
But because we have run out of time I would like to end the interview right here. Thank you so
much. Khieu Samphan: Thank you, Borin, and goodbye.