On Eve of Vietnamese Invasion Canadian Communist
League Delegation Visits Kampuchea, – The CCL 1/22/1979

The Call: You were in Kampuchea when the Vietnamese invasion began. What was happening in that
country at the time? Rashi: The Vietnamese aggression started on December 25, particularly in the
Northeast part of the country. The Kampuchean army was able to withstand this first attack. A few days
after we left Kampuchea, the main blow was struck in the Southeast. We travelled through areas which
the puppet front had described as strong bases, particularly in the Southeast. We saw absolutely no signs
of any insurgency, no signs of any revolt whatsoever, but instead saw the unity of the people around
the government. So we can very definitely say that it was purely Vietnamese aggression, without any
kind of internal insurgency. How prepared were the Kampucheans for the invasion? From our talks with
Prime Minister Pol Pot and Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary, it seems very clear that the Kampuchean
people were prepared and expecting the attack for a long time. Pol Pot told us very clearly that the strategy
and tactics of the Kampuchean people were basically people’s war. This is what Pol Pot told us: “Strateg
-ically the Vietnamese cannot take Kampuchea. The leadership of the Party, the united people and the
army are steeled through many years of fighting the U.S. Tactically, however, we must be very vigilant.
The enemy can penetrate, especially under cover of heavy airpower, artillery and tank forces. “But when
the war keeps carrying on, Vietnam will face many problems. “Since the battles take place on our territory,
they may have lots of plane attacks, but the determining factor is to have a lot of infantry forces. They will
have neither the people nor the food. They have to bring everything to supply their troops. “We start on
protracted war. Based on this, we are confident of success. The U.S. attacked us ferociously. Lon Nol
had tens of thousands of troops against us. The Thieu-Ky army invaded us. And we still won.

“So whatever temporary difficulties the Vietnamese cause us, we know we will win against them.” Pol
Pot attached a lot of importance to the heavy use of airpower in this offensive. He said that last year the
Vietnamese offensive was essentially done with tanks and infantry. But this year, he predicted that there
would be heavy use of airpower. Pol Pot very clearly said that the extensive use of airpower stemmed
from the fact that most of the planes were being piloted by Russian pilots. He said that the Kampuchean
armed forces were able to monitor communication between the planes and the ground bases, which
were in Russian. Secondly, he said, many of the tank crews were Russian or belonged to the Warsaw
Pact forces. He also specifically said that, as far as logistics went, a lot of the military experts on the
ground were East German or belonged to other Warsaw Pact troops. Because of the heavy use of air
power, Pol Pot took into account the possibility of having certain losses in the early stages of the war,
and he said very clearly that the Kampuchean forces will not let themselves be engaged in any frontal
battle with the Vietnamese. The essential tactic was to concede the roads and the cities, which were
empty anyway; let the Vietnamese extend their line as deep as possible into Kampuchean territory;
then attack from the countryside. They would basically attack the flank and the rear of the incoming
enemy column with the aim of cutting them into smaller groups, which then could be annihilated more
easily by the Kampuchean armed forces. So the impression we had was that they were perfectly
prepared in terms of political strategy and military strategy for the Vietnamese attack. From what you
saw, what was the morale of the Kampuchean people in the face of the Vietnamese aggression?
From our trip all around the country we could gauge the morale as being fairly high. Quite a few of
the commanders and soldiers that we spoke to made frequent comparisons between the present
situation and the situation during the 1970-1975 national liberation war.

They said, if we were able to withstand saturation bombing by the U.S. at the time and still win, there is
no reason that we couldn’t win this present war with Vietnam. The second thing was that the army is still
organized on the basis of a people’s army. They have what they call regular troops, regional troops and
guerrilla units. The basis of the army was still guerrilla units, which were attached to every cooperative.
We saw one thing in the Southeast. We were five kilometers from the battle-line. There, a mobile brigade,
which is basically a group of peasants that is sent to work in various fields, was working just about under
the enemy guns. When we asked them how peasants could work in such conditions, they said, “After ten
years’ experience with war and with a high development of political consciousness due to the work of our
Party, our peasants understand very well that fighting isn’t only pointing a gun and pulling a trigger. It is
also being able to keep up production to the last moment in the face of the enemy and harvest as much
rice as possible.” They said, “All these people that you see working right now in the fields can be converted
within an instant into a fighting force.” How would you compare the reports being printed in the Canadian
and Western press about the invasion with what you saw happening while you were there? The main thing
which seems to be distorted in the Western press is the underestimation of the capacity of the Kampuchean
people and their ability to lead the people’s war. In other words, based on the fact that the Vietnamese
aggressors have taken the main roads and the cities—which are empty anyway—the Western press
has jumped to the conclusion that the “Khmer Rouge” regime has collapsed. I think a careful analysis
of the situation, based on the knowledge we have gathered through our travels in the country and our
discussions with Pol Pot, would point to the opposite. We got the impression that the evacuation of the
cities and the development of guerrilla units in the countryside was part of a plan which developed over
the past three years in order to answer any invasion or large-scale attack on the country.

The fact that the country was organized into cooperatives which were autonomous and self-sufficient
was part of a plan to prevent the economy from being disrupted by any kind of large-scale offensive.
That would allow any part of the country to be able to go on functioning almost autonomously, and
this would provide the food and nourishment necessary for any locally based guerrilla units. So I think
all these factors—economic, military and political—are really important in order to understand whether
a successful guerrilla war can be waged or not at the present time in Kampuchea. This is not taken
into account at all in the Western press.